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Political Science and 
the Marcos Dictatorship1
This essay examines the position of political science as a 
discipline during the Marcos dictatorship. It explores the 
variations in political scientists’ approach to Marcos. Some 
approved and justified authoritarian rule, while others tried 
to elevate the political events to the level of “theory.” There 
was hardly any critique of the dictatorship in part because 
political scientists’ interpretation of the world did not dovetail 
with realities on the ground. Studies critical of martial law 
came from somewhere else, spearheaded by former political 
detainees who dabbled in dependency theory and did field 
research, leaving the discipline catching up with these non-
political scientists until the end of martial law.
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[Political science] is a device “for avoiding that dangerous 
subject politics, without achieving science”
Alfred Cobban, British historian (Anderson 2011, 80)
INTRODUCTION
In 2011, four Filipino political scientists agreed to develop a 
“formulation of [Philippine] democracy [that is] ontologically 
dynamic, time-sensitive, [and a] historically evolving construct.” 
The goal was to do away with the “proliferation of adjectives 
qualifying allegedly democratic regimes, at times reflecting excessive 
conceptual stretching and/or meaning conflation, arguably leads to 
much analytical confusion in the study of democracies,” which they 
claimed had resulted in “analytical confusion,” making it difficult to 
“operationalize” Philippine democracy (Miranda in Miranda, Rivera, 
Ronas, and Holmes 2011, 2). Chasing the Wind: Assessing Philippine 
Democracy, was the result of this effort, and senior contributor, Prof. 
Felipe Miranda, opens the book with this lamentation:
It is with much regret that the writers collaborating in this 
volume conclude that theirs is not a democratic country, 
neither at this point in time nor sometime in the recent 
past. Whether a time frame of twenty-five or fifty years is 
used in assessing the Philippines makes no difference; it has 
not developed beyond formal democratic trappings and 
developed a working, modern democracy in the last five 
decades (Miranda in Miranda et al. 2011, xiii).
This is an odd lament given that Chasing the Wind came out in 
2011, a quarter of a decade since the overthrow of the dictatorship 
of President Ferdinand Marcos, sixty-five years since the United 
States granted the Philippines its independence, and ninety-six years 
since the first Department of Political Science was established at the 
University of the Philippines (UP). Indeed, why did Filipino political 
scientists overlook this “flaw” in the country’s political system? What 
“distracted” them from coming up with a precise and modern definition 
of Philippine “democracy” and instead litter the academic discourse 
with so much conceptual detritus? The leading culprits behind this 
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maldevelopment, according to Miranda (Preface in Miranda et al. 
2011, 34-35) are, of course, the corrupted inefficient state that the 
oligarchy has captured, looted, and used to suppress threats from below. 
Miranda worries that his colleagues have this “natural tendency… to 
cloak the brutality of oligarchic rule and pass it off as a democratizing 
albeit feckless governance.” And why has this been the case? The senior 
scholar gives a very pointed answer: the naiveté of political scientists 
had gotten the better of them. Miranda grouses:
[m]any academics, driven by wistfulness and intense longing 
for democratic governance can actually liberally respond to 
oligarchic politics by extending its practitioners a most liberal 
benefit of doubt. They are then vulnerable to being recruited 
by the powers that be and eventually lend their prestige and 
expertise to anything but democratic national administrations. 
Quite a few of those who served [Marcos’] Cabinet as well 
as many who served the past Arroyo administration are of 
this liberal mindset. Many like-minded Filipinos are in active 
service in the present Aquino administration (Miranda in 
Miranda et al. 2011, 35).
Compromised and distracted by their bureaucratic duties, political 
scientists forgot their critical distance and wasted requisite time needed 
to theorize. Whatever writings they had done fell short of Miranda’s 
expectations. Coming out of their pens are nothing but a mélange of 
ill-defined concepts that confuse more than clarify. What Chasing the 
Wind wants to do then is bring political scientists back to the business 
of conceptualizing “ontologically dynamic, time-sensitive, [and] 
historically evolving construct[s]” about Philippine politics. Sentiment, 
Miranda argues, must give way to analytical clarity, ideological bathos 
to ivory tower objectivity, and political compromises to data-driven 
healthy skepticism. In short political scientists must bring science back 
to the study of politics and bring back the discipline’s forte: a detached 
evaluation of the political landscape.2
This was not entirely an accurate portrait. The conceptual mess that 
Miranda depicts is not necessarily the result of liberal gullibility. For 
one, the decision to become a part of the state administrative apparatus 
was not solely informed by a liberal and pleasant innocence. Some of 
Miranda’s colleagues were easily lured into joining the bureaucracy, 
sincerely believing in the state’s goals and policies. The discipline 
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also seemed unable to overcome the enduring habit of undervaluing 
ethnographic and historical research. Thus you have on the one end, a 
wholesale embrace of an existing political arrangement, and on the other, 
a refusal or lack of interest of complex realities. Political scientists have 
spent more time cherry-picking data to fit pre-fabricated frameworks 
rather than taking the bold step of examining the premises of these 
perspectives themselves and develop an alternative perspective.3 All 
these help us understand Miranda’s early 21st century dirges and 
his proposal that his colleagues be more scientific in collecting data 
upon which they could build plausible explanations about Philippine 
politics.
This paper is an overview of these issues as they played out during 
the Marcos dictatorship when the state was in its most centralized form, 
and political choices were simplified and polarized. There were political 
scientists who supported and justified “constitutional authoritarianism,” 
and there were those who tried to “objectively” understand the nature 
of the authoritarian beast. Only a handful openly opposed the 
dictatorship. These scholars would also be pushed to the side by non-
political scientists who turned out to be better theoretically-equipped, 
and whose works were solidly empirically grounded. This paper stops 
at the point when the dictatorship unraveled and a new constitutional 
order replaced it. This post-authoritarian moment prompted a surge 
of more animated writings within the discipline and signaled a new 
phase in the development of the discipline, when a new generation 
began to take the lead. It therefore deserves a separate essay on its own 
especially since it’s has been 31 years since the ouster of Marcos.
THE ADVOCATES
The initial response by some political scientists to martial law was 
to help provide the dictatorship for a justification for its existence. 
Emerenciana Arcellana (B.A. Political Science, UP, 1948; Ph.D. 
Political Science, UP, 1981) insisted that “[e]ven the world’s most 
reputable democracies assume more authoritarian tones when the 
situation calls for strong government, stricter discipline, and more 
restraint on individual rights…temporarily to tide over a threatened 
system through a crisis” (Arcellana 1974, 42-51).4 This option was not 
associated with authoritarianism; it was, in fact, an important prop of 
democratic politics. As Arcellana put it: 
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Most democratic constitutions provide for emergencies as a 
matter of self-preservation, and a crisis government so based 
may still be constitution though de facto authoritarian. Hence 
the term constitutional authoritarianism [and any] attempt 
to understand Philippine politics today must come to grips 
with this term (Arcellana 1976, 65). 
Arcellana did not say if this “emergency as a matter of self-
preservation” had a time limit and said nothing about the New 
Society – the new status quo that Marcos conjured to distinguish his 
extended rule from the past. But she expressed confidence that the 
dictatorship would have no legitimacy problems, averring that since 
Filipinos were “disposed to obey authority and [were] inclined to 
peaceable occupations,” it would be “safe to assume that on the whole 
Filipinos do wish to develop into a modern and more prosperous nation” 
(underscoring mine).  To Filipinos, Marcos was the “resolute leader 
who can show them the way,” and who, with the First Lady, Imelda, 
embodied the “strong but compassionate father/mother figures” that 
Filipinos always yearned to have (Arcellana 1976, 68). 
Wilfredo Villacorta (B.A. Political Science, UP, 1965; Ph.D., 
International Law and Relations, Catholic University of America, 
1972) agreed with Marcos that Congress and the Constitutional 
Convention were engaged in nothing but a “petty exercise [of legislative 
debate which] is uncalled for, especially since it concerns the future 
of the nation” (Villacorta 1975, 30). The anti-Marcos leaders inside 
these two institutions were never interested in the pursuit of good 
governance, and this indifference is evident in their inability to stop the 
worsening of “social ills,” and put a stop to “the persistent occurrence 
of crimes, and vices characteristic of the Old Society.” Worse, these 
politicians had failed to reverse a general “purposelessness among the 
youth [and] general apathy among the citizenry.” Villacorta revealed 
his political color here, sharing Marcos’ antipathy towards the activism 
that took students to the streets to oppose a reactionary state and 
dream of a better future for “the masses” (Villacorta 1975, 24). The 
professor was grateful that by declaring martial law, Marcos saved 
the day, prevented an impending crisis and restored a functioning 
government in a heart’s beat. Villacorta had deftly removed Marcos 
from the political game oligarchs were playing, forgetting that the 
President was a player in it and was, in fact, the most Machiavellian 
of them all. 
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Democracy was not the immediate and urgent issue at hand. 
Villacorta believed that if the country had to hasten its march to 
political maturity there were more important functions of the state 
other than democratic politics. He argued that government must: (a) 
“increase in the capacity of the political system;” (b) maintain the pace 
of “the process of specialization of political roles and structures;” and 
(c) the universalization of the “norms in the government’s relations 
with the population” (Villacorta 1975, 37). And he was clear as to 
who was in the best position to introduce these “universal” norms, 
as well strengthen state capacities, roles and structures: the Marcos 
dictatorship. Villacorta (1975, 37) closed his essay by appealing 
directly to Marcos to “realize the transformation of our people [for in 
this] present period of our history …the political machinery and the 
national disposition are conducive to positive change.” 
Standing apart from these sententious declarations was Onofre D. 
Corpuz (B.A. Political Science, 1950; Ph.D. Political Economy and 
Government, Harvard University, 1956), founder of the Development 
Academy of the Philippines; Marcos’ Department of Education 
Secretary; and University of the Philippines President). Corpuz called 
martial law the midwife of vision of a new society that would replace 
a sick old order of – quoting Marcos - “privilege and irresponsibility 
whose excesses and inequities [had] spawned the unrest and the 
violence that threatened the old order, [and which nurtured an] 
injustice and unresponsiveness to the needs of the greater number” 
(Corpuz 1976, 4). 
Corpuz then turned his sights on “the Anglo-Saxon tradition” and 
attacked it as actually being anti-people. He argued that the Americans 
implanted the Jeffersonian version of this Western democracy in the 
Philippines, but it turned out to be an ideology that provided “the 
most powerful and respectable justification in western political 
thought of the oligarchic domination of society” (Corpuz 1976, 16). 
Worse, this American “democratic” philosophy’s primary concern was 
quite narrow – it stood for the “liberty and welfare of the privileged,” 
but not “the liberty and well-being of the people” (underscoring mine). 
To the hungry and illiterate Filipino majority, Jeffersonian democracy 
and its so-called Bill of Rights did not “offer solace and hope,” because 
these ideas were “far removed from their [the poor’s] lives” (Corpuz 
1976, 18-19). 
That popular “solace and hope” would only come in the hands 
of the State and its leaders. The State, according to Corpuz (1976, 
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19), was the positive social force that possessed the potential to turn 
the poor majority into a “partner in the search for a better quality of 
human life.” A strong state would “redress radical imbalances in the 
distribution of values amongst its citizens, [redistribute the] wealth 
amongst them, [and provide the] special services [to create the] 
opportunities [for] the less fortunate members of the community to 
rise nearer to the levels of ease and dignity attained by others” (Corpuz 
1976, 20). In the Philippines, that “strong state” was embodied in 
the Marcos dictatorship. Corpuz was effusive in his admiration for 
the dictator: Marcos was the “mirror of our triumphs and ideals, our 
highest virtues and strengths… of what we can be, and ought to be.” 
The New Society that the autocrat established “invites us to liberate 
ourselves from the old prejudice of underestimating our capabilities 
as a people, and instead to arm ourselves with a sense of potency and 
confidence in our resources” (Corpuz 1976, 34). 
This was the intimate bond between Marcos-as-leader and the 
people he leads that many historians missed, engrossed as they were 
about “the protracted suffering until death of millions of human beings 
due to malnutrition, ignorance, unemployment, etc.” Corpuz (1976, 
30-31) was contemptuous of these leftwing scholars, referring to them 
as “elitist in this old and narrow sense, and so we have little awareness 
of this great struggle” of poor Filipinos. Although he never mentioned 
them directly, Corpuz was clearly pointing his fingers at the nationalist 
(and radical) historians from the University of the Philippines who 
were cognizant of what the political system had done to the poor, but 
whose notions of liberation – as Corpuz saw it - were anti-state and 
still informed by the politics of the “Anglo-Saxon tradition.”5
THE PARADIGM BUILDERS
Where Corpuz saw state and society as interconnected but also distinct 
realms, Remigio Agpalo (B.A. Government, University of Maine, 
1952; Ph.D. Political Science, Indiana University, 1958) saw fusion. The 
University of the Philippines professor and a colleague of Emerenciana 
Arcellana, described the Philippine political system as “an organism 
with a head, body, arms, legs, hands, feet, fingers and toes [that] grows 
through the ingestion and absorption of an external element that can 
be incorporated.” The system consisted of “the political elite and the 
people, the political elite acting as head,” while the people were “the 
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body, together with its limbs and other organic part.” Within this 
“organic-hierarchical paradigm, leaders arose from the “principal part 
of the body” (the brain; the pangulo) who exercised their authority over 
the people through “symbiosis and paternalism” (Agpalo 1992, 132-
133).6
This paradigm reached its apogee when Marcos declared martial 
law and overcame the linguistic and ethnic divide that deterred the 
development of the body politic. With the New Society, Agpalo 
suggested, the Filipino identity had become whole and the body 
politic mutated into its most mature form: the “societal pangulo regime” 
where inside the brain “a strong executive tackle[d] adequately and 
effectively the crises of identity, of participation, of distribution, and 
of government.” And how would this pangulo regime deal with those 
opposed to it? Agpalo referred to the anti-Marcos groups as “elements 
that cannot be incorporated because they are destructive or cancerous, 
are purged, rejected, destroyed, or neutralized” (Agpalo 1992, 169).7 
They would ceased to be part of the body politic. Revolutions and anti-
state violence would never be able to make a breach in the system and 
destroy it; in fact despite their virulence they could be neutralized, not 
destroyed but assimilated. For the pangulo regime possessed this ability 
to engage in the “politics of incorporation,” and any anti-state politics 
– be it be politicians or revolutionaries - was doomed to fail.
Agpalo’s younger colleague, Alexander Magno (B.A. Political 
Science, University of the Philippines, 1975; Certificate, University 
of Poitiers, France, 1980; and M.A., Political Science, University of 
the Philippines, 1981) used neo-Marxist optics to scrutinize the 
dictatorship’s complex armature.8 Magno borrowed extensively from 
the sociologist Nicos Poulantzas’ amplification of Karl Marx’s “relative 
autonomy of the state,” and asserted that, the Philippine state, in 
its authoritarian form, had assumed “the role of leading instrument 
for ‘national development’ in response to the intensifying crises of 
underdevelopment” (Magno 1990, 183-218).9 Under the Marcos 
dictatorship, the state had become “relatively autonomous” and thus 
placed itself in a position to be the development leader. This new position 
was the result of its strategic personnel being able break from the control 
of powerful elites and pursue a “pro-people” and “pro-nation” agenda. 
Magno was referring in particular to the Marcos technocrats whose 
professionalism and protection from a pro-development President, 
enabled them to also withstand pressure from popular social forces like 
labor unions, business associations and professional organizations. 
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Magno, who dabbled in Marxism in his younger academic 
years, wrote his pieces with the resurgent communist movement 
in mind. While the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) 
recognized that the state had assumed a fascist visage under Marcos, 
and thus had discarded any pretensions of being liberal democratic, 
its ideologues still did not deviate from the orthodox Marxist (and 
Maoist) description of the state as a mere “executive committee of 
the ruling class.” Magno saw this as too simplistic, and thereby was 
unable to explain “the warped class circumstances of underdeveloping 
(sic) societies” like the Philippines (Magno 1990, 183-218). If it 
looked at the dictatorship from the prism of Poulantzian “relatively 
autonomy,” then the CPP must make major adjustments to its political 
and military strategies. Under the dictatorship, the Party’s “three 
basic problems” – the comprador capitalists, their imperialist masters, 
and the landed families – had ceased to be the main targets of the 
revolution. Instead, the CPP must refocus its political attacks on the 
state’s technocrats and its military assaults on strategic units of the 
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). The goal would be to weaken 
if not destroy these two foundations of this relatively autonomous state 
and therefore weaken the state to a point where it will overthrown (or, 
from a Leninist perspective, be “smashed”). Only after the “reactionary 
state” had collapsed will the revolution then turn its attention back to 
its class enemies.
Political reality, however, was harsh to these paradigm builders 
and flaws in their analyses began to appear, as the dictatorship began 
to reveal its real temperament. Marcos’ political behavior turned out 
to be riven with contradictions. The dictator claimed his regime was 
national developmentalist, but, in fact, he placed premium in looting 
the state. Together with his wife, he claimed to be the Filipinos’ Adam 
and Eve, but they were only father and mother to their kin and their 
cronies. The Marcoses maintained they were in power there to serve 
the nation, but they were more concerned with factional politics and 
patrimonial plunder.  
The dictatorship controlled the military, but Marcos’ use of the 
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) was but a Frankensteinian 
version of warlord or clan use of coercive agencies of to advance their 
interests. Marcos’ was “cacique” rule in its most intense form. The 
AFP was supposed to guarantee peace, but its ability to sustain this 
depended on how its top civilian leaders compromised with regional, 
provincial, and city elites. Moreover, by the end of the 1970s, it 
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became evident that the military was losing the protracted war in the 
countryside, unable to slow down communist expansion and caught in 
a no-win situation with Muslim separatists (Lallana 1989, 43-62).  It 
was not the relatively autonomous coercive state machine that Magno 
and others thought it was. 
Benedict Anderson’s succinct description of Marcos showed how 
far off Agpalo and Magno were in their description of a powerful 
pangulo and a relatively autonomous state leader.
Don Ferdinand can be seen as the Master Cacique or Master 
Warlord, in that he pushed the destructive logic of the 
older order to its natural conclusions. In place of dozens 
of privatized ‘security guards,’ a single privatized National 
Constabulary; in place of personal armies, a personal Army; 
instead of pliable local judges, a client Supreme Court; 
instead of a myriad pocket and rotten boroughs, a pocket 
or rotten country, managed by cronies, hitmen and flunkies 
(Anderson 1998). 
Agpalo’s and Magno’ paradigms had short shelf lives in the 
discipline’s library. No one among their peers debated with or against 
them, and none of the younger scholars had any interest in continuing 
the inquiries these pioneers had begun. In 1986, a flummoxed Agpalo 
saw his pangulo paradigm fall to pieces when Marcos was ousted 
from power. He spent the first months of post-authoritarian period 
questioning the legitimacy of President Corazon Aquino. For a brief 
moment, the senior professor who was always sensitive to being 
“objective,” fell off his academic perch and was submerged in “politics.” 
Agpalo later on recovered his bearings and made a dramatic revision 
to his paradigm. He described the Aquino regime as representing a 
third strand of the organic-hierarchical political body, distinguished 
by a more pronounced contention between political and social forces. 
The political and institutional combat were intense but these never 
broke up the body; in fact, it only became stronger. The organic-
hierarchical paradigm was still alive (Agpalo 1999, 45-60). Deep 
down, however, Agpalo remained an admirer of Marcos. In 2007, a 
year before he passed away, he published a 224-page tome that argued 
that the dictator had a place in Philippine history, having contributed 
immensely and positively in the shaping of the body politic. Ferdinand 
E. Marcos: A Hero in History was published by the Marcos Presidential 
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Center, which also happened to be the Marcos museum where, until 
recently, the presidential cadaver was frozen and preserved (Agpalo, 
2007). There is no evidence that the book caught the eye of his fellow 
political scientists. 
By the last years of martial law, Magno had abandoned paradigm 
building and switched to writing about political conjunctures as he, and 
many others, competed to explain why the dictatorship was faltering.10 
It was the end game and figuring out the how the regime would end 
and what possible coalition would replaced it was the call of the day. 
Magno eventually stopped any pretense of academic research and 
scholarship soon after, and he ended his flirtations with neo-Marxism 
and decided it was time to go conservative. Nothing was heard of the 
“relatively autonomous” state after that. 
Nothing came out of Corpuz’s pen after his 1973 essay was 
published. His “secondment” as Education Secretary took much of 
his attention and energy, and his UP presidency was no walk in the 
park. After a year he took office, the UP President committed his first 
faux pas, announcing tuition fee increases by the start of the 1977 
school year. Corpuz would face the largest student protest since the 
declaration of martial law, a signal to him as well as the dictatorship 
that the communist underground at UP had regained the footing it lost 
in 1972. By the time he completed his term, the New Society – that 
“mirror of our triumphs and ideals, our highest virtues and strengths… 
of what we can be, and ought to be” - was in free fall. After Marcos was 
ousted, Corpuz quietly went back to his first passion, historical research 
and wrote the two-volume Roots of the Filipino Nation (Corpuz 1989). 
The first volume is an excellent review of pre-colonial and Spanish 
Philippines, but the second volume is quite uneven: the first seven 
chapters were about the Philippine revolution against Spain, the next 
three on the American colonial era. Then Corpuz abruptly stopped 
there; he never extended his studies to the post-war period, including 
the martial law years. 
Emerenciana Arcellana went back to full time teaching, and wrote 
two book, the first on Philippine-American relations, and the second 
on the continuing relevance of the ideas of the late nationalist senator 
Claro M. Recto (Arcellana 1996). Wilfrido Villacorta diversified his 
academic interests and was all over the place. His tracts ranged from 
the international relationships of the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN), Japan and the Soviet Union, the late Marcos and 
early Aquino periods, national security and economic policy, American 
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influence on the Philippine constitutions, and even political linguistics! 
He eventually became a senior official in the ASEAN. In his resume, 
Villacorta’s list of publications began in 1983; the 1975 piece on the 
New Society was not mentioned (Villacorta 2014).
Political science remained an intellectual wasteland under martial 
law because the most adroit among its scholars had stopped exploring 
and elaborating on their paradigms. But equally responsible was this 
lingering reticence of many from the field to figure out whether their 
conclusions were correct or not. The empirical foundations that the 
paradigms first built their arguments on were scrawny, and this glitch 
was never resolved because of the absence of empirical heft from the 
“real world.” For critiques of the dictatorship one had to look elsewhere 
and outside the discipline. 
IN THE REALM OF REAL POLITICAL CRITICISM
In 1975, taking advantage of a speech by Marcos where he claim to be a 
Third World leader, Francisco Nemenzo, then dean of UP’s College of 
Arts and Sciences, set up the “Third World Studies Program (TWSP),” 
to revive “critical thinking” inside the university. The Program also 
became a place of refuge for newly released political detainees, who, 
as “research fellows,” began collaborating with a small leftwing UP 
faculty to revive radical research. Among these fellows, two stood out: 
Rigoberto Tiglao (B.A. Philosophy, UP, n.d.) and Eduardo Tadem 
(B.A. Philosophy, 1975; M.A. Asian Studies, 1985; Ph.D. Southeast 
Asian Studies, National University of Singapore, 2016), both former 
communists who were detained during the early years of martial law 
and, after their release, completed their undergraduate degrees at UP 
and invited to join the TWSP’s circle of fellows. 
A UP Law Center team hired Tiglao to join a research team 
that was tracking the growth of transnational capital under martial 
law. He would use the raw data to write several exploratory essays 
on the Philippine political economy using dependency theory as a 
theoretical guide. These essays challenged communist assertions that 
the Philippines was eternally “semi-feudal and semi-colonial,” a state 
that “US imperialism” preserved since the latter would never allow 
its neo-colony to achieve full capitalist development. The country 
would also be eternally agricultural, thanks also to a landlord class that 
would never cede its power in the countryside. The law research data 
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however showed the opposite. As a result of the entry of transnational 
corporations, Tiglao observed the emergence of a capitalist economy, 
evidenced by a rapidly expanding export-agriculture and semi-
manufacturing sectors, where transnational corporations were a visible 
presence. This dependent capitalism had diminished “semi-feudal” 
relations of production, as the landed elites moved their monies to 
export crop production or assembly plants. Peasants were dispossessed 
of rice lands after their owners became corporate growers of primary 
export crops and because state corporations were now leasing their 
public lands to transnational corporations. With no work in the rural 
areas, many were compelled to move to the urban centers where jobs 
in the manufacturing and service sector were available. Those who 
stayed ceased to become tenants or small land proprietor and moved 
to plantation work.
Tadem moved back to Mindanao after graduating and settled 
in Davao, just in time to learn of the Muslim separatist wars, and to 
witness up close the rise of export crop agriculture in the southern 
frontier. He became a “research fellow” at the Mindanao-Sulu Pastoral 
Conference (MSPC), a leftwing organization composed of priests and 
nuns. The interests dovetailed with each other. Tadem wanted to look 
at corporate agriculture and the MSPC were concerned with the plight 
of the Mindanao peasantry. Tadem went on to conduct research and 
write about Japanese investments in the fishing industry, American 
fruit companies and their Filipino corporate growers, and the impact 
of the opening of the East Asian market to Philippine exports (Tadem 
1978 and Tadem 1979). The results were the first ever progressive 
study of the fishing industry, and of peasant resistance to the spread of 
corporate agriculture. Both were published by AFRIM and the TWSP, 
with the latter then gradually shifting its interests on capitalism in the 
country’s largest land frontier (Tadem 1978 and Tadem 1979). 
These studies on dependent-capitalism in the Philippines posed 
worried ideologues of the CPP. The decline of the agricultural sector 
meant that “genuine land reform” as an issue with which the Party 
would attract peasants had become superfluous. Without the peasantry, 
the revolution had lost its principal source of recruits to its New 
People’s Army (NPA) and without this mass base, the Maoist dream of 
“surrounding the cities from the countryside” was no more. The Party 
must now have to shift to an urban-centered strategy and convert rural 
cadres into organizers of labor unions, urban poor communities and 
student federations. Most important of all, the decisive battles against 
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the state would now be a combination of organized armed attacks on 
major government military and civilian institutions by urban guerilla 
units, propped and protected by continuous mass mobilization in the 
cities. 
The party’s defenders rebuked Tiglao and Tadem, but instead of 
resorting to polemics some agreed to the dependistas’ proposal that both 
sides engage in field research to determine which of their positions 
were empirically correct. In 1980, AFRIM hosted Tiglao who wanted 
to study the coconut industry after a Marcos crony took over its 
production and marketing. The research was published by AFRIM in 
1981 as a book with the awkward title: Looking into Coconuts: Export 
Oriented Agricultural Growth (Tiglao 1981). Looking into Coconuts was 
the first ever-Marxist analysis of an industry that was once a workhorse 
of the economy. Tiglao (1981) used Marx’s theory of “ground rent” as 
starting point to show that it was capitalist exploitation, not “feudal 
rent,” that had been the driving force of the industry. An agricultural 
proletariat now composed the industry’s labor force; not scrawny petty 
producers selling their harvests to different small to medium coconut 
oil producers. The catalyst for this capitalist transformation was the 
dictatorship, which intervened and “rationalized” the industry. 
AFRIM also published Tadem’s Mindanao Report, a comprehensive 
study of transnational companies, and the regime’s ambitious road 
building projects across Mindanao, the expansion of corporate 
agriculture and its debilitating effects on rural life, and on workers in 
the smaller industrial sector (Tadem 1980). He combined government 
statistics with the extensive data collected from the field, to show how 
much of the island’s economic landscape had been changed because of a 
more intrusive national state and a more assertive transnational capital. 
Like Tiglao, Tadem (1980) also notice how dependent capitalism was 
now the dominant mode of production in the island.. When the book 
came out, there were some grumblings among Mindanao communists, 
but AFRIM added it to its list of readings for its political education 
programs.11
Tadem’s and Tiglao’s works, as well as that of the other fellows 
and the TWSP staff itself, were welcomed by young faculty in search 
of readings for their courses. The TWSP papers were particularly 
instrumental in introducing Mindanao to the UP community, to allow 
students and faculty to understand the larger picture that framed 
the increasing trickle of stories about the Moro separatist rebellions, 
and the expansion of the communist party into the southern frontier. 
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Despite its small size, TWSP was able to accomplish its goals – provide 
critical and alternative perspectives in the study of Philippine politics 
and sociology. 
This circle of fellows, however, would not last long, In the last years 
of the dictatorship, this kind of Marxist theory-based research had 
fallen by the wayside as academic and public attention were riveted 
on the decline of the dictatorship. Fellows also left the TWSP for 
various reasons: Tiglao became a journalist, while Tadem went back 
to full-time teaching. In the post-Marcos period, even the TWSP had 
drifted away from strictly doing research to enrich leftwing theorizing. 
The priority now was “practical” policy-related tracts to help stabilize 
the new regime and suggests directions that it could pursue. In the 
meantime, the CPP splintered, depriving radical intellectuals of their 
most significant ideological adversary.12
What the fall of Marcos did was reinvigorate political science, 
as it did practically all sectors of a society suddenly released from 14 
years of suppression. The Philippine Political Science Journal (PPSJ) was 
publishing more diverse and critically relevant pieces especially from 
a younger generation of political scientists. The optimism, however, 
was mitigated by the discipline still being unable to overcome the 
long-standing handicap in its long history. Political science remained 
haunted by an old debility: people. 
DISCIPLINARY DECREPITUDE
In 1998, Agpalo took the lead in writing the first historical assessment 
of the discipline. The portrait he painted was not heartening. Focusing 
his attention on the 1960s, Agpalo (1998) deplored the small number 
of social science graduates in the 1969-1970 academic year: there were 
225 social science graduates among the 13,825 college graduates across 
the country, an extraordinarily low 1.62 per cent. From this cohort 
group, only 45 (0.32 per cent) finished college with a political science 
degree. Further disheartening was that none of these graduates was 
trained in political science; fifteen were in Foreign Service graduates, 
and the rest (30) majored in public administration (Agpalo 1998, 4). 
All the more were these numbers discouraging given that the country’s 
first Department of Political Science was founded in 1915.13
In 2005, seven years after Agpalo’s review came out, his 
colleague Olivia Caoili published a second review of the discipline, 
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albeit looking more on the obstacles she and her colleagues faced as 
faculty members. The foremost was the heavy teaching load, which 
took a toll on faculty research time. Moreover, since the majority of 
courses taught were at the undergraduate level (the appeal for the law 
remained, but foreign service as a program was abolished in UP), the 
graduate program suffered. Moreover, if it was hard to recruit students 
into the latter, it became much harder for students who got into 
the program to complete their studies, especially at the Ph.D. level. 
Government “secondments” took away the best faculty members, who 
were supposed to develop and enrich UP’s graduate program, and help 
colleagues in other schools to expand the teaching of political science 
(Caoili 2005, 164-165).
There were attempts to remedy the situation and in 1962, 
members of the UP Department of Political Science established the 
Philippine Political Science Association (PPSA) to give the discipline 
a permanent presence and attract colleagues from other schools. These 
objectives were never accomplished, and PPSA was not heard of for 
the next 13 years. The association was revived in 1976, and it was able 
to hold several national conferences across the country until the early 
1980s (Appendix 1). The PPSJ’s editorial board reprinted papers from 
these conferences, including several that were muted critical appraisals 
of the dictatorship (these, however, never reached the same level of 
sophistication as the works of the TWSP fellows). The majority of the 
journal essays, nonetheless, hewed closely to development priorities 
of the dictatorship (Appendix 2). Finally, the association was given 
added boost when the Philippine Social Science Council, the umbrella 
association of various social science disciplines invited it to join its 
board. In 1978, PPSA joined the International Political Science 
Association.14 
Five years after Caoili’s review, it was Julio Teehankee’s turn to 
appraise how far the discipline had gone forward (Teehankee 2010, 4). 
He wrote that the discipline had gained “speed of development in the 
discipline particularly on a variety of issues, ranging from civil society 
studies, local government, democratization and the peace process in the 
southern island of Mindanao (Teehankee 2010, 8).” Teehankee partly 
attributed this to the transformative impact of the 1986 People Power 
Revolution and the subsequent return of constitutional politics as the 
catalysts for this newfound vigor of the discipline’s clerisy. Alas, this 
resurrection was short-lived. Soon after its formal revival, the PPSA 
once again “went into its second period of inactivity for the next 13 
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years” (Teehankee 2010, 8). Political science remained an unattractive 
career and the discipline’s graduate programs continued to be lethargic. 
UP’s Political Science department graduated its first Master of Arts 
(M.A.) graduate in 1925, but it produced its first Ph.D. student only 
in 1970, fifty-five years since the Department’s establishment in 1915 
(Agpalo 1998, 167). 
Then in 2012, Ronald Holmes published a “cursory survey” of the 
state of the discipline. The study showed that there were now seven 
schools out of the 239 major universities of the country offering an 
M.A. degree, but only two – UP and the University of Santo Tomas – 
have Ph.D. programs (Holmes in Miralao and Agbisit 2012, 3).15 This 
numerical thinness is evident once again in the discipline’s debility: in 
2012, 97 years since political science was formally established in the 
Philippines, Holmes listed 35 political scientists with M.A. degrees 
and 26 with doctorates (see Table 1).
Institution Bachelor’s Master’s Doctorate
University of the 
Philippines Diliman 0 17 11
Ateneo de Manila 
University 0 8 5
De La Salle University 0 7 6
University of Santo 
Tomas 1 3 4
Total 1 35 26
 
Table 1. Highest Degree Attained by Political Science faculty in four Manila universities 
(Holmes 2012, 4)
CONCLUSION
This paper tried to explain why a discipline, that is now a century 
old, was hampered for most of its life by an incapacity to theorize. 
Until recently, political science has lagged behind historians, political 
economists, and journalists when it came to explaining the Byzantine 
world of Philippine politics. During the Marcos era, the discipline was 
stymied by timidity and fear, as well as by influential and senior political 
scientists believing in the dictatorship. Anti-state criticism was muted 
and while there were attempts at paradigm-building (for and against 
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the state), these were constrained by two other obstacles–political 
science’s raison d’etre (pre-legal education; public administration) and 
the peculiar and still-unexplainable unwillingness of political scientists 
to test their theories in the field. 
As a result, political criticism moved elsewhere, in the etchings 
of leftwing non-political scientists who wrote excellent works on the 
martial law political economy and on authoritarian politics and culture. 
Political science eventually caught up with these exceptionally good 
non-specialists, but this happened only after Marcos fell from power. 
PPSJ issues began to publish works on oligarchs, institutionalism, 
gender, environment, international relations, and Asian regionalism 
(Solidum 1975, Makasiar Sikat 1976, and Duka Ventura 1979). Yet, 
none of the essays showed any potential for becoming the precursors 
Agpalo, Corpuz, and Magno did in the 1970s. A palpable reticence 
among many of the authors to push their arguments to a logical 
theoretical conclusion is still evident.
There were “outliers,” of course, who distanced themselves from 
the popular oligarchic rule-cum-cacique democracy paradigm. The 
works of Nathan Gilbert Quimpo and Jennifer Franco revealed a 
post-authoritarian political landscape that was not simply dominated 
by oligarchs and caciques. “Redemocratization,” these scholars argued, 
did not mean a restoration of the pre-1972 status quo as the post-
authoritarian era exhibited its own distinct features suggesting a “break” 
from the old order. The most prominent of these is that the co-existence 
between oligarchic politics and a bevy of left-wing movements, “civil 
society” groups, and autonomous community organizations was now a 
permanent facet of state-society relations after Marcos (Quimpo 2008 
and Franco 2001).16 These forces fought but also compromised with each 
other in the political arena. 
The drawback of Franco and Quimpo’s works was timing (their 
books were published at a time when the EDSA revolution had ceased 
to inspire many) and of the authors living abroad, and thus unable 
to debate with colleagues at home. Their impact was thus minimal, 
its effectiveness aggravated by this recurring tension between “local” 
and “foreign” scholars over whose works are better in capturing the 
nuances of Philippine studies.17 Where the “breakthrough” came from 
was in “scientific” polling. The founding of the Philippines’ top two 
professional public opinion agencies (Ateneo Social Weather Station 
in 1985 and over a decade later, Pulse Asia in 1999), and the frequent 
use of surveys by politicians and governments themselves made this 
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kind of research the centerpiece of the discipline. One of the founders 
of these two agencies was Felipe Miranda
Will “science” and “the political” find full theoretical happiness 
by the middle of the 21st century Philippines? Will Felipe Miranda’s 
discomfort be assuaged? There are signs that indicate leading political 
scientists are moving towards this direction. Two are worth mentioning 
here. The recent works by Julio Teehankee on electoral politics attempt 
to return to the critical study of this popular ritual since the 1996 survey 
of elections as a form of mass mobilization by two senior non-Filipino 
scholars (Teehankee 2006, Teehankee 2002, Anderson in Taylor 1996, 
and Tria Kerkvliet in Taylor 1996). Teehankee has begun probing 
deeper on the relationship between clientilism on party politics and the 
power of political clans. This is heartening as the first topic was covered 
extensively by political scientists abroad but hardly given any attention 
in the domestic front, while the second’s best evaluations were written 
by journalists and never political scientists (Teehankee in Tomsa and 
Ufen 2013; Teehankee 2001). Teehankee’s colleague Francisco Magno 
has brought in social capital and state-society relations into the study 
of forestry and environmentalist politics and diplomacy, an interesting 
cross-pollination of disciplines and topics (1993). 
The elephant in the room, however, remains unstudied. Filipino 
political scientists have yet to set their eyes on the 15 years of the 
Marcos dictatorship, and pick up where their “elders” left off.18
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NOTES
1 When I first suggested to my colleagues that we should offer a course on the 
history of political science, and found that no one thought it was a good idea, I 
interpreted the resistance in practical terms. Perhaps they thought we had no one 
who could devise and teach such a course? It turned out that it was not necessarily 
the case. The problem was how to interpret the relationship between ‘political’ 
and ‘science.’ If one emphasized political and bracketed ‘science,’ then the course 
would have to start with Plato and continue through, say, Fukuyama. But if one 
did the reverse, the history would not go back much more than a hundred years, 
when the term was invented in the context of a very American merger between 
public administration and constitutional law (Benedict Anderson 2016, 158-159). 
 
I wish to thank Caroline S. Hau and Robin Tatu for enriching this essay, correcting 
its mistakes, and commenting on its strength and inadequacies. Problems 
associated to this essay, after its publication, are of his own making.
2 Autobiography greatly informs this introduction. Despite his known pre-martial 
law leftwing sympathies, Miranda was not arrested but was “seconded” to the 
one of the regime’s think-tank, the Development Academy of the Philippines, 
staying in his post until the 1980s: one of those liberals who would “lend [his] 
prestige and expertise to anything but democratic national administrations.” He 
only turned into a critic of the regime after the 1983 assassination of the top 
Marcos opposition leader (and father of the current president) Benigno Aquino, 
Jr.
3 I am extremely grateful to Carol Hau for reminding me of this bigger picture. 
Political economy is also one area where there is a dearth of writings. I shall, 
however, not include this in this paper but reserve it for another piece.
4 On Arcellana, see the articles by Olivia C. Caoili, 2013, Emerenciana Yuvienco 
Arcellana, Philippine Political Science Journal, 34 (1): 4-5; and Linda B. Bolido, 
2011, The other Arcellana, Philippine Daily Inquirer, 23 May.
5 The scholar Lisandro Claudio refers to this nationalist school as “the Diliman 
Consensus” in the book Liberalism and the Postcolony: Thinking the State in 
20th –Century Philippines, Singapore and Kyoto, Japan: National University of 
Singapore Press, and the Kyoto University Press, 2017: 25-28, 33-36.  
6 The essay was originally published as a monograph in 1973.
7 This essay was originally published in the Philippine Law Journal (56) (March 
1981): 56-98.
8 Magno’s senior colleague, Francisco Nemenzo, wrote an abridged summary 
of dependency theory but did not follow this up a longer piece to elaborate 
on the paradigm. See Francisco Nemenzo, Jr., A Summary of Dependency and 
Liberation, Philippine Political Science Review, Nos. 5-6 (June-December 1977): 
3-4.
9 Andre Gunder Frank, The Development of Underdevelopment, New York. Monthly 
Review Press, 1966 and Nicos Poulantzas, State, Power, Socialism, London and 
New York. Verso Press, 1978.
10 The middle and latter parts of Magno’s only book illustrate this shift away from 
theory to conjunctural analysis. See his Politics without Form: Essays on the 
Filipino State and Politics, Manila. Kalikasan Press. 1990:183-218.
11 AFRIM supported the next phase of Tadem’s research, and together with younger 
researchers, Tadem turned to more specific export industries: fish, forests and 
fruits. See Eduardo C. Tadem, Johnny Reyes and Linda Susan Magno, Showcases 
of Underdevelopment in Mindanao: Fishes, Forest and Fruits, Davao City: 
Alternate Resource Center and Forum for Approaches in Research, Media and 
Development, 1984.
12 Self-disclosure: I was a research associate at the TWSP from 1979 to 1988, and 
was involved in several of the Program’s research projects (the banana industry, 
and a Southeast Asia-wide collaboration on “transnationalization, the state, and 
the people.” I was also doing my own research on the Marcos military and the 
CPP. This section is an abridged version of an introduction I wrote in the selected 
reprint of the successful TWSP book Marxism in the Philippines. See Patricio N. 
Abinales, Introduction, in Revisiting Marxism in the Philippines, Pasig City: Anvil 
Publishing, 2010: 1-12.
13 See the “History” section on University of the Philippines Department of Political 
Science website, http://polisci.upd.edu.ph/about/history.html. There is no record 
as to when a Department of Political Science was created at the University of 
Santo Tomas, the country’s oldest institution of higher learning.
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14 See the Association’s website at http://www.philpolsci.org/home/about-us 
15 This has increased lately. De La Salle University started its Ph.D. in Political 
Science in 2015.
16 There is no record of these two books selling well. 
17 On this complicated interaction between “local” and “foreign” scholars, see: 
Lisandro Claudio, 2013, Postcolonial fissures and the contingent nation: an 
antinationalist critique of Philippine historiography, Philippine Studies 61 (1): 45-
75; and Caroline S. Hau, 2014, Privileging roots and routes: Filipino intellectuals 
and the contest over epistemic power and authority, Philippine Studies 62 (1): 
29-65.
18 The regressive consequence of not studying martial law have become apparent 
of late: the complete rehabilitation of the Marcoses with popular backing, a 
populist approbation of the Marcos dictatorship and dissatisfaction towards 
post-authoritarian politics, and, worse, a widespread ignorance about those 
fateful 15 years by the younger generation of Filipinos. See this recent report by 
Jonathan Kaiman and Sunshine de Leon, In the Philippines, the Marcos name is 
back, even as memories of the dictator have faded.
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